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Case No. 20080963-SC 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
JACOB B. LOVELESS, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from its opinion in State v. Loveless, 2008 UT App 336, 194 P.3d 202 
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (WestSupp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue. When the State files an information that includes a lesser alternative 
charge, may the defendant avoid prosecution of the greater charge by simply 
pleading guilty to the lesser charge, over the objection of the State? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision 
of the court of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, % 9, 22 P.3d 
1242. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that 
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate 
standard of review." Id. A trial court's acceptance or rejection of a guilty plea is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48, \ 12,122 
P.3d 571. However, the proper interpretation of statutes and rules is a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, f 5,150 P.3d 540. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES 
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum B: U.S. Const. 
amend. V; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 
(West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 
(West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3 (West Supp. 2008): Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-2 (West 2004); Utah R. Crim. P. 4; Utah R. Crim. P. 5; Utah R. Crim. P. 11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While at a late night party at a campsite, defendant is alleged to have fired 
his .45 caliber handgun into a sleeping bag occupied by the victim, causing him 
serious bodily injury. See R. 62-60, 67-66; Loveless, 2008 UT App 336, | 2 . The 
State originally charged defendant with: (1) reckless endangerment, a class A 
misdemeanor, and (2) carrying a dangerous weapon while under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1. The State later amended count 
1, charging Defendant with "AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a third degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 [(West 2004)], . . . . OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE ... RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT, a class A misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 [(West 2004)]... ." R. 25-24 (Addendum 
C). Defendant was bound over to stand trial on the alternative charges in count 
1, R. 35-36, but the bind-over on count 2 was quashed. R. 77-72. 
Four days before trial was to begin, defendant filed a notice of intent to 
enter a guilty plea to the lesser, alternative charge of reckless endangerment and 
requested that the matter be set for a plea hearing. R. 431-30. At a pretrial 
conference three days later, the State objected to the plea attempt, arguing that 
defendant could not unilaterally decide to enter a plea to the lesser, alternative 
charge. R. 476: 4-5. Alternatively, the State moved to dismiss the reckless 
endangerment charge. R. 476: 6-7. The district court rejected both arguments. 
The court ruled that by charging alternative offenses, the State gave defendant 
the option of pleading guilty to one or the other, and having done so, could not 
object to a plea to the alternative charge or otherwise dismiss the alternative 
charge after defendant stated an intention to so plead. R. 476:19-21; R. 434-33. 
The following day, the State filed a motion to reconsider. R. 462-38. The 
district court denied the motion and entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on both motions. R. 437-36, 472-67. That same day, the court entered an 
order to stay a plea hearing pending resolution of the State's petition for 
interlocutory appeal. R. 474-73. The Court of Appeals granted the State's 
petition for interlocutory appeal and affirmed. Loveless, 2008 UT App 336. This 
Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When the State files an information, it commences a criminal action, the 
purpose of which is to obtain a judicial determination of the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. If the State charges offenses in the alternative, a defendant's 
admission of guilt to one alternative charge does not absolve the trial court of its 
obligation to adjudicate the other. While maintaining innocence as to the 
greater offense, the defendant may very well admit guilt to the lesser offense. 
But such an admission would only ensure that the defendant will be adjudicated 
guilty of at least the lesser offense. Accordingly, were the trial court below to 
accept Defendant's guilty plea to reckless endangerment, the State is still 
entitled to a judicial determination of Defendant's guilt as to aggravated assault. 
Moreover, the rules of criminal procedure do not permit a trial court to accept a 
guilty plea to a lesser offense or to dismiss a charge without the agreement of 
the prosecution. 
Furhermore, double jeopardy rights do not bar continued prosecution of 
the aggravated assault charge. The aggravated assault charge is included within 
the original criminal action and there is no issue of multiple punishments. 
Indeed, alternative charging avoids double jeopardy issues. 
Even assuming the amended information was procedurally defective in 
accomplishing the State's objectives, the trial court abused its discretion in not 
allowing the State to amend the information accordingly. 
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ARGUMENT 
WHEN THE STATE FILES AN INFORMATION CHARGING A 
LESSER ALTERNATIVE OFFENSE, DEFENDANT MAY NOT 
AVOID PROSECUTION OF THE GREATER OFFENSE BY 
PLEADING TO THE LESSER ALTERNATIVE CHARGE OVER 
THE STATE'S OBJECTION 
More than three decades ago, this Court held that a criminal information 
may charge offenses in the alternative. See State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136,1138 
(Utah 1977). Consistent with that holding, the State charged Defendant, in 
Count 1 of the amended information, with: 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a third degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 . . . . 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT, a class A misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 
R. 25-24. The court of appeals held that by so doing, the State "accept[ed] the 
possibility" that the defendant "would admit to the crime that carried the lesser 
penalty," Loveless, 2008 UT App 336, f f^ 12, that the trial court would accept that 
plea without "the prosecutor's permission," id., and that Defendant could 
thereby "avoid being convicted of the other, more heinous crime" of aggravated 
assault, see id. at ]f 9. This Court should reverse. The holding of the court of 
appeals represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and function 
of a criminal prosecution. 
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A. An information is a formal accusation filed with the trial court, 
which commences a criminal action that entitles the State to a 
judicial determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence on 
the charges set forth in the information. 
A "criminal action77 encompasses all of "the proceedings by which a 
person is charged, accused, and brought to trial for a public offense.77 Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-3(1) (West Supp. 2008). In Utah, a prosecution is typically 
"commenced by the filing of an information,77 Utah R. Crim. P. 5(a), which is a 
written "accusation . . . charging [the defendant] with a public offense,77 Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-3(3). Upon its filing, the information and any accompanying 
affidavit is reviewed by a magistrate to assure "there is probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused has committed 
it.77 Utah R. Crim. P. 6(b). If the information is supported by probable cause, 
"the magistrate . . . issue[s] either a warrant for the arrest or a summons for the 
appearance of the accused.77 Utah R. Crim. P. 6(a). 
Before the State may proceed to trial in felony cases, it "must [also] show 
'probable cause7 at a preliminary hearing,77 unless the hearing is waived by the 
defendant. State v. Clark, 2001UT 9, % 10,20 P.3d 300; accord Utah Const, art. I, § 
13.l If the magistrate finds probable cause and binds the defendant over for 
1
 Unlike the initial probable cause review, the preliminary hearing "is 
adversarial in nature, and a defendant has the 'opportunity to attack the 
prosecution's evidence and to present any affirmative defenses.7" State v. Virgin, 
2006 UT 29,1f 31,137 P.3d 787 (citation omitted). 
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trial, the defendant must appear for arraignment, where he or she is called on to 
plead to the charges set forth in the information. Utah R. Crim. P. 10(a). "A 
defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(b). 
"A plea of guilty is an acknowledgement of the offense charged/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-2(2) (West 2004). It is, in essence, "a confession of the 
correctness of the accusation" and "dispenses with the necessity of proof 
thereof." State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203,207,171 R2d 383,385 (1946). If accepted 
by the trial court, it constitutes an adjudication of guilt, "plac[ing] a defendant in 
the same position as a verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the charge after a 
fair and impartial trial." Id. In contrast, " [a] plea of not guilty is a denial of the 
guilt of the accused and puts in issue every material allegation" of the offense 
pled to. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(1). Accordingly," [w]hen a defendant enters 
a plea of not guilty, the case [must] forthwith be set for trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 
u(d). 
In sum, a criminal prosecution is " [t]he continuous following up, through 
instrumentalities created by law, of a person accused of a public offense with a 
steady and fixed purpose of reaching a judicial determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused." Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis 
added); accord State v. Donlay, 853 P.2d 680, 683 (Kan. 1993). A criminal 
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prosecution is not unlike a civil action. When a plaintiff commences a civil 
action, he or she seeks a "judicial determination" of allegations made, as set 
forth in a complaint. Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, ^ 4,194 P.3d 897. When 
the State commences a criminal action, it likewise seeks a judicial determination 
of allegations made, as set forth in an information. 
B. The State is entitled to a judicial determination of a defendant's 
guilt or innocence as to alternative charges in an information. 
The charging of alternative offenses in an information does not change the 
nature of the criminal prosecution. The objective remains the same: "a judicial 
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Black's Law Dictionary 
1221. In this case, the filing of the information commenced the prosecution, and 
after a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over to stand trial on both 
charges under Count 1. R. 35-36. Accordingly, the State is entitled to a "judicial 
determination" as to whether Defendant was guilty of aggravated assault or, in 
the alternative, reckless endangerment. 
Defendant "has sought to plead guilty to only one of the offenses charged 
in the information—[reckless endangerment] — presumably to avoid being 
convicted of the other, more heinous crime" of aggravated assault. Loveless, 
2008 UT App 336, at f^ 9. Defendant cannot, however, foreclose a judicial 
determination of his guilt or innocence as to aggravated assault by simply 
pleading guilty to reckless endangerment. By statute, a guilty plea to reckless 
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endangerment would represent "an acknowledgement of [that] offense," Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-2(2), and would "dispense[ ] with the necessity of proof" 
thereof, Stewart, 171 P.2d at 385. But Defendant's not guilty plea to aggravated 
assault still "puts in issue every material allegation" of that offense, Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-2(1), and by rule, requires that the case "be set for trial" on that 
charge, Utah R. Grim. P. 11(d). In other words, Defendant's admission of guilt 
to reckless endangerment would not absolve the trial court of its obligation to 
adjudicate the aggravated assault. 
The court of appeals' implicit holding to the contrary is inconsistent with 
the holding and rationale of this Court in State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136 (Utah 
1977). The Court in Butler recognized that the State may prosecute alternative 
charges. Id. at 1138. The Court explained that the State may proceed to trial on 
both charges unless they are "repugnant to each other." Id. But if the 
alternative charges are repugnant to each other, the Court held that a defendant 
may force the prosecution to "make an election upon which [alternative] theory 
it will proceed." Id. Yet, under the holding of the court of appeals below, a 
defendant is allowed to make that election for the prosecution by simply 
pleading guilty to one of the alternative charges, whether or not they are 
repugnant to each other. Such a result is contrary to the teachings of Butler and 
should be reversed. 
-9-
C. The State does not forego its right to a judicial determination of 
the charges by electing to charge alternative offenses in one 
count. 
In State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188 (Utah App. 1988), the court of appeals 
made clear that a defendant cannot plead guilty to a lesser offense to avoid 
conviction on the greater. Turner was charged with driving left of center and 
criminal negligence. Id. at 1188-89. After accepting Turner's guilty plea to 
driving left of center, the trial court dismissed the negligent homicide charge. 
Id. at 1189. In reversing, the court of appeals held that "under the circumstances 
of th[e] case, acceptance of the plea over the timely and specific objections of the 
State was unfair and unreasonable, effectively nullifying the State's right to 
prosecute defendant on the charge of negligent homicide." Id. at 1190. 
Recognizing that "'[sjociety has [an] interest in the vindication of criminal 
justice and . . . the state . . . ha[s] an interest in an error free determination of the 
case/" the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in 
"accepting, over the State's objection, defendant's guilty plea to driving left of 
center." Id. (quoting State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342, 348 (Utah 1980) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)) (brackets and ellipses supplied in Turner). 
The court of appeals held below that Turnerwas inapposite because of "an 
important procedural difference between the prosecution in Turner and in the 
instant case." Loveless, 2008 UT App 336, % 10. The court held that whereas "the 
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offenses in the [Turner] information were charged as separate counts, such that 
the prosecution was attempting to convict the defendant of both driving left of 
center and negligent homicide/' the amended information here "consists of just 
one count/' charging Defendant with "committing either aggravated assault or 
reckless endangerment, but not both." Id. The court of appeals concluded that 
" [i]t is this distinguishing factor that prevents the result sought by the State." Id. 
The court of appeals' reliance upon the distinction between charging the 
offense in a single count, as opposed to separate counts, is misplaced. Because 
the rules of criminal procedure do not address how to file charges in the 
alternative, courts turn to applicable rules of civil procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
81(e). Under rule 8, "[a] party may set forth two or more statements of a claim 
. . . alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or in separate counts . . . ." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) (emphasis added). In other words, charging the 
alternative offenses in a single count, rather than in separate counts, had no 
effect on the nature of the information. 
The court of appeals also reasoned that" [i]f Defendant had attempted to 
plead guilty to the offense of aggravated assault, the State could not reasonably 
argue that the trial court would need the prosecutor's permission to accept the 
plea." Loveless, 2008 UT App 336, at f^ 12. The court then concluded that "there 
is no reason why the trial court would need permission to accept a guilty plea to 
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the other crime charged in the alternative." Id. The court of appeals is mistaken 
on both counts. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party 
has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a 
lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the 
agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(h)(1). This provision implies that a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of a charge, requires the agreement of the prosecutor. 
The rule does not differentiate between charged and uncharged lesser included 
offenses. Because the prosecution in this case did not agree to the guilty plea to 
reckless endangerment or to the disinissal of aggravated assault, the trial court 
would abuse its discretion if it accepted the plea. 
D. Where a defendant pleads guilty to some but not all charged 
offenses, double jeopardy does not bar the continued prosecution 
of any unresolved charges. 
Underlying Defendant's decision to plead to the lesser offense, and the 
prosecutor's objection thereto, is the assumption that double jeopardy 
protections would bar the State from continuing the prosecution on the 
aggravated assault charge. This Court has recognized that" the double jeopardy 
guarantee . . . protects a defendant from (1) a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Rudolph, 
970 P.2d 1221,1230 (Utah 1998). Where "jeopardy attaches at the time the guilty 
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plea is accepted/7 State v. Kay, 717 R2d 1294,1303 (Utah 1986), acceptance of 
Defendant's guilty plea to reckless endangerment would arguably preclude the 
State from continuing the prosecution on aggravated assault. Such an 
argument, however, was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. 
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984). 
Johnson was charged with murder, involuntary manslaughter, 
aggravated robbery, and grand theft for the robbery and shooting death of 
Thomas Hill. Id. at 495. Over the State's objection, the trial court accepted 
Johnson's guilty pleas to involuntary manslaughter and grand theft, sentenced 
him on those charges, and dismissed the charges alleging the greater offenses. 
Id. at 496. Johnson argued that because the trial court accepted his guilty pleas 
to involuntary manslaughter and grand theft, the double jeopardy prohibitions 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments barred further prosecution on the 
more serious offenses of murder and aggravated robbery. Id. at 494. The United 
States Supreme Court rejected that argument. Id. 
The Court observed that the first two double jeopardy protections — 
precluding a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or 
conviction — " ensure[ ] that the State does not make repeated attempts to convict 
an individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and 
expense, while increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an 
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impermissibly enhanced sentence/' Id. at 498-99. The Court held that 
prosecution of the murder and aggravated robbery charges was not barred 
under these protections, because " [t]he grand jury returned a single indictment, 
and all four charges were embraced within a single prosecution/' Id. at 500-01.2 
The Court explained that the third double jeopardy protection—barring 
multiple punishments for the same offense —"is designed to ensure that the 
sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the 
legislature/' Id. at 499. The Court held that prosecution of the greater offenses 
was also not barred under this protection, because Johnson was never found 
guilty of the greater offenses, much less punished for them: "the [Double 
Jeopardy] Clause "does not prohibit the State from prosecuting [a defendant] for 
such multiple offenses in a single prosecution," but rather, it prohibits 
"cumulative punishments" for the same offense. Id. at 499-500. The Court 
explained that "[t]he trial court's dismissal of these more serious charges did 
more than simply prevent the imposition of cumulative punishments; it halted 
2
 The Court explained that trial proceedings are not like "amoeba, . . . 
capable of being infinitely subdivided, so that a determination of guilt and 
punishment on one count of a multicount indictment immediately raises a 
double jeopardy bar to continued prosecution on any remaining counts that are 
greater or lesser included offenses of the charge just concluded." Johnson, 467 
U.S. at 501. 
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completely the proceedings that ultimately would have led to a verdict of guilt 
or innocence on these more serious charges/' Id. at 499-500. 
The Court thus held that "[n]o interest of [Johnson] protected by the 
Double Jeopardy Clause [was] implicated by continuing prosecution on the 
remaining charges brought in the indictment." Id. at 501. Where Johnson 
"offered only to resolve part of the charges against him," he was "not . . . 
exposed to conviction on charges to which he pleaded not guilty" and the State 
was not given the opportunity to try him more than once. Id. In short, a 
continued prosecution of the unresolved offenses implicated "none of the 
governmental overreaching that double jeopardy is supposed to prevent." Id. at 
502. 
Because continued prosecution would not offend double jeopardy 
protections, the Court observed that "ending prosecution now would 
[impermissibly] deny the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to 
convict those who have violated its laws." Id. The Court thus held that even 
though the trial court accepted the guilty pleas to the lesser offenses, Johnson 
"should not be entitled to use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent 
the State from completing its prosecution on the remaining charges." Id. 
Although the charges in Johnson were not filed in the alternative, the 
principles in Johnson apply with equal force to the alternative charges filed in 
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this case. Like the defendant in Johnson, Defendant here has "offered only to 
resolve part of the charges against him." Johnson, 467 U.S. at 501. Therefore, 
prosecution of aggravated assault would not implicate any double jeopardy 
concerns. Prosecution of the aggravated assault charge would not be barred 
under the protections against multiple prosecutions, because both charges 
"were embraced within a single prosecution." Id. at 498-99. Moreover, 
prosecution of the aggravated assault charge would not be barred under the 
protection against multiple punishments, because Defendant has never been 
tried or convicted, much less punished, for aggravated assault. Id. at 499-500. 
Accordingly, "ending prosecution now would [impermissibly] deny the State its 
right to one full and fair opportunity to convict" Defendant of the greater 
offense charged in the information. Id. at 502. 
E. When the same act may establish different offenses, the filing of 
alternative charges is an appropriate procedure to avoid issues of 
merger and double jeopardy. 
The court of appeals reasoned that the information's alternative charge 
"reasonably led the trial court to believe that the prosecutor was not trying to 
convict Defendant of both offenses listed." Loveless, 2008 UT App 336, at f^ 13. 
This observation is undoubtedly true. Indeed, where both offenses are based on 
the same act, Defendant cannot be sentenced for both crimes. See Johnson, 467 
U.S. at 499-500; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (West 2004) (stating that "when 
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the same act of a defendant arising out of a single criminal episode shall 
establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under different 
provisions,.. . the act shall be punishable under only one such provision"). 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor's decision to charge in the alternative did not 
suggest that the prosecutor was not seeking a conviction on the greater offense. 
Otherwise, he would not have charged it all. Indeed, by first charging 
aggravated assault, and then reckless endangerment in the alternative, the 
prosecutor signaled a primary intent to obtain a conviction for aggravated 
assault. However, the evidence was such that it "tend[ed] to prove elements of 
more than one statutory offense." See State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 
1983). No doubt recognizing this, the prosecutor charged Defendant with 
reckless endangerment "in the alternative." R. 25. 
The State could have charged Defendant with both aggravated assault and 
reckless endangerment. But as noted, Defendant cannot be punished for both 
crimes. See Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499-500; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1). 
Accordingly, were the State to charge both crimes and the jury return a guilty 
verdict on both, the lesser offense (reckless endangerment) would merge with 
the greater (aggravated assault). See State v. Rnlayson, 2000 UT10, 1^f 17-23,994 
P.2d 1243. The merger doctrine "'protects criminal defendants from being twice 
punished for committing a single act that may violate more than one criminal 
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statute/" State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ^ 7,122 P.3d 615 (quoting State v. Diaz, 2002 
UT App 288, Tf 17, 55 P.3d 1131). 
The necessity of merger, however, may be avoided if the offenses are 
charged in the alternative or otherwise presented to the jury in the alternative. 
" [T]he State may [thus] proceed to trial on more than one charge, when it seeks 
only one conviction based on a single act or transaction." State v. Allison, 126 
N.H. I l l , 113, 489 A.2d 620, 621 (N.H. 1985). As explained by the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, "th[is] rule rests upon a practical recognition that 
before trial the evidence may not be completely known, and when introduced 
may support alternative interpretations and inferences." Id. 
F. Even assuming an information charging alternative offenses in 
one count allows the defendant to plead guilty to either 
alternative without the prosecutor's permission, it was an abuse 
of discretion to deny the prosecution's request to amend the 
information to avoid that result 
In any event, what is clear from the proceedings is that the prosecutor 
intended to bring Defendant to trial on the charge of aggravated assault. When 
confronted with Defendant's notice that he intended to plead guilty to reckless 
endangerment, the prosecutor objected, and alternatively, requested dismissal of 
the reckless endangerment charge. R. 476:4-7. Finding that the information was 
"procedurally" defective to accomplish this aim, the court of appeals concluded 
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that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in agreeing to accept Defendant's 
guilty plea to reckless endangerment Loveless, 2008 UT App 336, f^ 13. 
The court of appeals7 holding exalts form over substance. As recently 
observed by this Court, "[t]he justice system is not a sporting event in which 
each side has a right to exploit every tactical advantage available/' Medel v. 
State, 2008 UT 32, ^ 54,184 R3d 1226; accord State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91,94 (Utah 
1982) (recognizing that "a criminal trial is much more than just a contest 
between the State and an individual which is determined by strategies 
appropriate to determining the outcome of a game"). Rather, the purpose of the 
justice system "is the vindication of the laws of a civilized society against those 
who are guilty of transgressing those laws." Howell, 649 P.2d at 94. "Important 
constitutional rights . . . are not conceived to give the accused a 'sporting chance' 
against the machinery of the State," but rather "to ensure that only the guilty are 
deprived of their liberty." Medel, 2008 UT 32, ^ 54. 
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the amended information was 
defective in accomplishing the purposes of the prosecution, barring the State 
from conforming the information to reflect the prosecution's intent is an abuse 
of the court's discretion, especially where the aggravated assault charge was 
already bound over for trial after a finding of probable cause, and where 
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Defendant "is not prejudiced in presenting a full and complete defense/' See 
Howell 649 R2d at 95. 
In sum, the treatment of the court of appeals is inconsistent with the 
purpose and function of a criminal prosecution. It is also inconsistent with the 
decisions rendered by this Court. Moreover, if the decision of the court of 
appeals is permitted to stand, the authority to charge in the alternative is 
rendered meaningless. In a case such as this, the State would have little to no 
incentive to charge in the alternative, for it would be taking the risk that the 
defendant would take the matter away from the jury in deciding the facts of the 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted April 8, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JE^/REY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney Gen 
Counsel for Petitioner 
e^Q 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on April 8, 2009, two copies of the foregoing brief were 
mailed • hand-delivered to: 
Michael D. Esplin 
Esplin & Weight 
290 West Center Street 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
A digital copy of the brief was also included: S Yes • No 
'-fjZjCLs /(fljQL^j^si^ j 
Addenda 
ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Jacob B. Loveless, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070419-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 18, 2008) 
2008 UT App 336 
Fourth District, Provo Department, 041403254 
The Honorable Claudia Laycock 
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Michael D. Esplin, Provo, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Billings. 
BENCH, Judge: 
fl The State appeals from the trial court's interlocutory 
decision to allow Defendant to plead guilty to reckless 
endangerment, a class A misdemeanor. Because the information 
contained a single count accusing Defendant of either aggravated 
assault or reckless endangerment, it was within the discretion of 
the trial court to rule that Defendant could enter his guilty 
plea, as charged, to the offense of reckless endangerment. We 
therefore affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 On July 31, 2 0 04, Defendant attended an outdoor party in 
Payson Canyon. Defendant brought a firearm with him. Shortly 
after his arrival, he and some other attendees took turns firing 
the weapon into a wooded area away from the campfire. At some 
point during the party--unbeknownst to Defendant--the victim 
moved his sleeping bag away from the campfire into an area 
covered with tree stumps and lay inside it on the ground. 
Defendant subsequently sought to empty the rounds of ammunition 
from the firearm by firing at the stumps near the victim, 
resulting in the victim being shot and wounded. 
i^3 The State originally charged Defendant with one count of 
reckless endangerment, a class A misdemeanor, and one count of 
possession of a dangerous weapon while under the influence, a 
class B misdemeanor, to which Defendant entered pleas of not 
guilty.1 The State later filed an amended information containing 
just one pertinent count: aggravated assault or, in the 
alternative, reckless endangerment. 
^4 Following the resolution of several pretrial matters that 
are not implicated in this appeal, the trial court scheduled a 
jury trial on the alternatively charged count for April 2007. A 
few days before trial, Defendant notified the trial court that he 
intended to plead guilty as charged to reckless endangerment. 
Despite the prosecutor's objection and subsequent attempt to 
dismiss the reckless endangerment portion of the information, the 
trial court ruled that it would allow Defendant to plead guilty. 
The prosecution filed its Motion to Reconsider, which the trial 
court denied after oral argument. The trial court then entered 
an order staying further proceedings pending the outcome of the 
interlocutory appeal now before us.2 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f5 The State challenges the propriety of the trial court's 
interlocutory ruling that will allow Defendant to plead guilty to 
the offense of reckless endangerment. "We review a trial court's 
acceptance or rejection of a guilty plea under an abuse of 
discretion standard." State v. Turner, 980 P.2d 1188, 1189-90 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citing to rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure as the source for a trial court's discretion 
in accepting or rejecting guilty pleas). 
xThe State's original charge that Defendant illegally 
possessed the weapon in question while under the influence was 
subsequently dismissed by the trial court as a result of 
Defendant's motion to quash bindover and is not at issue on 
appeal. 
2Because of the trial court's stay, Defendant has yet to 
actually enter his guilty plea. 
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ANALYSIS 
f6 The State claims that the trial court abused its discretion 
by ruling that Defendant could plead guilty to reckless 
endangerment despite the prosecutor's objections. A trial court 
exceeds its discretion when "the actions of the judge are 
inherently unfair." Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190. Additionally, if 
the decision goes "'beyond the limits of reasonability,'" a court 
has exceeded its discretion. State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 
(Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992)) ; see also Turner, 980 P.2d at 1190. 
1f7 The State argues that State v. Turner, 980 P. 2d 1188 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998), requires reversal of the trial court's decision. 
We disagree. In Turner, the defendant drove a truck pulling a 
trailer across the center line, hitting and killing a 
motorcyclist. See id. at 1189. The prosecution charged the 
defendant with one count of negligent homicide and one count of 
driving left of center in violation of Utah law. See id. The 
defendant pleaded guilty to the second count, driving left of 
center, and asked the trial court to impose a sentence 
immediately. See id. The prosecution objected, claiming that 
the defendant was attempting to create a double-jeopardy 
situation by which the defendant's conviction and sentence for 
driving left of center would shield him from prosecution on the 
more serious count of negligent homicide. See id. After 
multiple hearings on the matter, the trial court accepted the 
defendant's guilty plea for driving left of center, and the 
prosecution appealed. See id. 
1J8 On appeal, we held that a criminal defendant does not have 
an absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted by the trial 
court and that the decision to accept or reject a guilty plea 
lies within the trial court's discretion. See id. at 1190. We 
further held that, under the facts and circumstances of Turner, 
the trial court's decision to accept the guilty plea to the one 
count of driving left of center was an abuse of discretion 
because such an acceptance of the guilty plea nullified the 
prosecution's ability to prosecute the defendant on the other 
charged count of negligent homicide. See id. 
%9 Admittedly, there are some similarities between Turner and 
the instant case. As in Turner, Defendant's conduct, at least at 
the pretrial stage of the case, could be classified as a crime 
under multiple sections of the criminal code. Similarly, 
Defendant has sought to plead guilty to only one of the offenses 
charged in the information--the offense that carries a lesser 
punishment--presumably to avoid being convicted of the other, 
more heinous crime listed in the information. Further, like the 
Turner plea, the instant proposed guilty plea is not part of a 
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plea bargain. The State urges us to rely on these similarities 
and to hold that Turner controls and that reversal is required. 
1fl0 The State's analysis, however, ignores an important 
procedural difference between the prosecution in Turner and in 
the instant case. In Turner, the offenses in the information 
were charged as separate counts, such that the prosecution was 
explicitly attempting to convict the defendant of both driving 
left of center and negligent homicide. Here, because the State's 
amended information consists of just one count, Defendant has 
been charged with committing either aggravated assault or 
reckless endangerment, but not both. It is this distinguishing 
factor that prevents the result sought by the State. 
fll The State argues that our affirming the trial court's 
decision to allow the guilty plea will undermine a prosecutor's 
discretion to "determine whether or not to prosecute, what charge 
should be made, and whether or not to dismiss . . . or accept a 
plea to a lesser offense." State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 404 
(Utah 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). A prosecutor 
does have the discretion to decide what charges to file, 
including the right to charge in the alternative, see State v. 
Montoya, 910 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), and to determine 
"in what manner to prosecute [a] case," Bell, 785 P.2d at 402. 
However, the State has failed to provide any legal support for 
its specific contention that a trial court lacks the authority to 
accept a guilty plea to one of two alternatively charged offenses 
over the prosecutor's objection. Although the prosecutor has the 
discretion to charge a defendant in the alternative, that does 
not mean that there are no consequences subsequent to the 
exercise of that discretion. 
|^ 12 If Defendant had attempted to plead guilty to the offense of 
aggravated assault, the State could not reasonably argue that the 
trial court would need the prosecutor's permission to accept the 
plea. Similarly, there is no reason why the trial court would 
need permission to accept a guilty plea to the other crime 
charged in the alternative. The prosecutor explicitly charged 
that Defendant committed either aggravated assault or reckless 
endangerment. In so charging, the prosecutor must accept the 
possibility that Defendant would admit to the crime that carried 
the lesser penalty.3 
3We again note that the instant case does not involve a plea 
bargain by which the defendant has agreed to plead guilty in 
return for some form of consideration from the prosecution, such 
as the dismissal of other charges. In plea bargain situations, 
the prosecution's acquiescence to the plea would obviously be 
(continued...) 
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fl3 The nature of the instant information reasonably led the 
trial court to believe that the prosecutor was not trying to 
convict Defendant of both the offenses listed--just one or the 
other. Therefore, the trial court's interlocutory ruling to 
allow Defendant to plead guilty to one of the offenses charged in 
the alternative was not "inherently unfair," State v. Turner, 980 
P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), or "beyond the limits of 
reasonability,» State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
fl4 The prosecutor chose to charge Defendant with one count of 
aggravated assault or, alternatively, one count of reckless 
endangerment. Defendant chose to plead guilty as charged to 
reckless endangerment, one of the two alternatively charged 
offenses. While the trial court is not required to accept 
Defendant's guilty plea, it is within its discretion to do so 
given the nature of the information and the proceedings. Turner 
does not require a different result given that the offenses in 
Turner were filed as separate counts, not in the alternative. 
1^15 We affirm the trial court's ruling. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
fl6 WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
3
 (. . .continued) 
required. Here, Defendant has sought to plead guilty to the 
crime with which he was charged. 
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ADDENDUM B 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004) 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of [the Utah 
Criminal Code], the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars prosecution 
under any other such provision. 
* * * 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
* * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004) 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
* * * 
[B-l] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112 (West 2004) 
(1) A person commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not 
amounting to a felony offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that 
creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. 
(2) Reckless endangerment is a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3 (West Supp. 2008) 
For the purpose of this act: 
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is charged, 
accused, and brought to trial for a public offense. 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation in writing presented by a grand jury 
to the district court charging a person with a public offense. 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person with 
a public offense which is presented, signed, and filed in the office of the clerk 
where the prosecution is commenced pursuant to Section 77-2-1.1. 
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice or judge of a court of record or not of 
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance with Section 
78A-5-107, except that the authority of a court commissioner to act as a 
magistrate shall be limited by rule of the judicial council. The judicial council 
rules shall not exceed constitutional limitations upon the delegation of judicial 
authority. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2 (West 2004) 
Every plea shall be entered upon the record of the court and shall have the 
following effect: 
(1) A plea of not guilty is a denial of the guilt of the accused and puts in 
issue every material allegation of the information or indictment; 
(2) A plea of guilty is an acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of the 
offense charged; and 
(3) A plea of no contest indicates the accused does not challenge the 
charges in the information or indictment and if accepted by the court shall have 
the same effect as a plea of guilty and imposition of sentence may be rendered in 
the same manner as if a plea of guilty had been entered. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4 (Prosecution of Public Offenses) 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by 
indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the 
offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by 
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the 
offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out 
probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things as 
time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged 
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, written 
instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be 
identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things 
may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor 
matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an 
indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at 
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an 
indictment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such 
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the 
same set of facts. 
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(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable 
him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of 
particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days 
thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its 
own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be 
amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may 
require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a 
statement of factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the 
particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any 
name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso 
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual 
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal 
meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate 
the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or 
information was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to 
endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the 
court on application of the defendant Upon request the prosecuting attorney 
shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses 
he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to 
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. 
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural person. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 5 (Information and Indictment) 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prosecutions whether for 
felony, misdemeanor or infraction shall be commenced by the filing of an 
information or the return of an indictment. Prosecution by information shall be 
commenced before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have 
been committed unless otherwise provided by law. 
* * * 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (Pleas) 
"k "k *k 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to 
plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of 
not guilty. 
* * * 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith 
be set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
* *k * 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or 
rejected by the court. 
* * * 
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ADDENDUM C 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo,Utah 84606 
Telephone: 801-851-8026 
Fax: 801-851-8051 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACOB B. LOVELESS 
662 South 600 West 
Payson,UT 84651 
DOB: 05/13/1984, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED INFORMATION 
Case No. 041403254 
Judge r>jy 10 
OTN: 
KAY BRYSON, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the defendant(s) of the following 
crime(s): 
COUNT 1: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
103, in that JACOB B. LOVELESS, on or about July 31, 2004, in Utah County, Utah did commit 
assault as defined in Utah Code § 76-5-102 under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
? 
r 
RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-112, in 
that JACOB B. LOVELESS, on or about July 31, 2004, in Utah County, Utah, under circumstances not 
amounting to a felony offense, recklessly engaged i conduct thay created a substantial risk of death or 
serious bodily injury to another person. 
COUNT 2: CARRY4NG^A DANGEROUSJ&EAPON WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
ALCOHOE~ORA CONTRX9LJ-ED-SUB^TAN^Era-c1assF3 misdemeanor in\4nkii«rr6iijtah Code 
(UH 
Ann. 176-10-528rkftB^t JACOB B^LOVELESk , on or about JuhJdr^K)4, in Utah County 
carry kdangerptis weapa^whilelinder the influence^ alcohpl^facontrolled substance. 
Information is based on evidence provided by: Det. McDaniel, Utah County Sheriffs Office. 
/ fi. 5k 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
January 11,2005 
io/Mj/i rmfh 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
RANDY KENNARD 
